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Abstract 
We develop a view of the MNC as a knowledge-creating and and utilizing 
entity, building on the extant literature on the differentiated MNC as well as 
on Lyles and Schwenk’s work on corporate knowledge structures. The 
starting point for this conceptualization is that MNC management through 
choices regarding organizational control, motivation and context can 
influence the development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge.  This 
extends existing literature.  For example, in most of the literature, the 
characteristics of knowledge are seen as exogenous rather than endogenous 
variables.  However, to the extent that management chooses a specific way 
of sourcing knowledge, it also implicitly chooses the characteristics of the 
sourced knowledge and the ease with which it can be transferred inside the 
MNC.  This is because knowledge from different knowledge sources have 
different characteristics and are thus transferred at different cost. The six 
hypotheses that we draw from the main argument are tested on the basis of 
a unique and very rich dataset on subsidiary knowledge development 
(including information on the organizational setting, sources of subsidiary 
knowledge and the extent of knowledge transfer to other MNC-units) that 
has been constructed in connection with a cross-national project Centres of 
Excellence (Holm and Pedersen 2000a). The dataset covers more than 2.000 
subsidiaries located in seven different European countries. 
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I. Introduction 
Although the role of knowledge and learning in gaining and sustaining competitive 
advantage has been a central field of research in several literatures in strategic 
management for more than a decade,1 rather little is known about some of the 
central aspects, mechanisms and contextual factors in the relevant processes. In 
much research simplistic taxonomies of knowledge - usually centering on the tacit-
explicit distinction - are applied, and there is seldom a recognition of the extent to 
which, for example, the tacitness of knowledge is a choice variable. Moreover, the 
literatures on the connection between knowledge and competitive advantage have 
paid rather little attention to the organizational aspects of the connection.  For 
example, little attention is being paid to those organizational mechanisms that may 
decrease “internal stickiness” and help diffusing valuable knowledge inside the 
firm, while still keeping knowledge inimitable to would-be imitating rivals. As a 
somewhat crude generalization, the development, characteristics and transfer of 
knowledge are thus seldom consistently taken to be endogenous to organizational 
processes and arrangements.  In the literature, it is ⎯ again as somewhat crude 
generalization ⎯ rather the other way around: Organizational arrangements are 
seen as rational responses to the requirements implied by different characteristics of 
knowledge. 
 Arguably, the literature has paid some attention to the organizational aspects 
of the development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge. On the overall level, 
there is a well-known argument that the differentiated MNC is in fact more favorably 
positioned than the non-differentiated MNC or the purely domestic firm with 
respect to mobilizing knowledge in the development and renewal of competitive 
advantage, simply because of its access to more knowledge networks (Hedlund 
1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989).  Important work has addressed the organizational 
dimensions of such MNC knowledge mobilization (Gupta and Govindarajan 1991, 
1995). Moreover, recent research has led to a renewed conceptualization, 
understanding and appreciation of subsidiaries which are now seen as potential 
sources of MNC-wide strengths (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1986, 1989; Birkinshaw 1996; 
Forsgren, Pedersen and Foss 1999), and perhaps even as “centers of excellence” 
(Moore and Birkinshaw 1998; Holm and Pedersen 2000a). Thus, the organizational 
dimensions of knowledge creation and transfer of knowledge are certainly not 
completely neglected. However, what is true of the strategic management literature 
in general is also true of the international business literature: There are still 
significant gaps in the understanding of central aspects, mechanisms and contextual 
                                                 
1  Work on these issues arguably began with Lippman and Rumelt (1982).  Since then a cottage 
industry has emerged on the various characteristics of knowledge that may hinder the imitability 
of rent-yielding knowledge assets, such as causal ambiguity (Mosakowski 1997), complexity, and 
tacitness (Winter 1987).  Much of this has taken place in the context of resource-based (Wernerfelt 
1984; Barney 1991), knowledge-based (Grant 1996), and evolutionary theories of the firm (Nelson 
and Winter 1982; Foss, Knudsen and Montgomery 1995). 
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factors of the process of managing knowledge, notably developing, transferring and 
influencing the characteristics of knowledge. Most fundamentally, there is no 
coherent view of what it means to say that the MNC is a knowledge-based entity. 
The present paper represents an attempt to address and contribute to remedying 
some of these weaknesses.   
 We take our starting point in the notion of a corporate knowledge structure 
(Lyles and Schwenk 1992), and argue that the MNC may be understood as consisting 
of core and more peripheral systems of beliefs, values, etc. that influence processes 
of acquisition, accumulation, utilization and transfer of further knowledge.  These 
knowledge processes are partly endogenous outcome of management decisions 
relating to, for example, the relations between subsidiaries, and between subsidiaries 
and the center, how many and which decision-making rights that are granted to 
subsidiaries (Jensen and Meckling 1992), the sources of knowledge that subsidiaries 
tap into (Foss and Pedersen 2001), and how many resources are invested in 
codification efforts ⎯ all given complementarities between knowledge elements in 
the MNC, the characteristics of knowledge (complexity, tacitness, etc.) and 
knowledge sources (internal, external) and pre-existing organizational 
arrangements. In particular, we shall focus on managerial choices relating to 
knowledge sources and organizational control and motivation.   
 In the following we proceed as if top-MNC management confronts a well-
defined multivariate optimization problem with respect to the development and 
transfer of knowledge.2 Thus, norms of (strong) managerial rationality are assumed 
throughout, as are a top-down approach. Specifically, the organizational design 
problem is to choose organizational instruments of control, motivation and context 
in such a way that some objective function (e.g., the total value of the MNC network, 
sustainability of competitive advantage) is maximized. This is accomplished by 
choosing organizational instruments such that 1) knowledge is optimally developed, 
2) knowledge is optimally transferred, and 3) the optimal MNC-wide mix between 
tacit and explicit knowledge components is achieved, all given the relations of 
complementarity between knowledge elements in the MNC, the characteristics of 
knowledge in terms of tacitness, complexity etc., and pre-existing organizational 
arrangements. Thus, our fundamental point is that a full picture of the MNC as a 
knowledge creating and using entity should treat the sources, transfer and mix of 
knowledge as endogenous variables. 
 We distinguish between knowledge sourced from internal development of 
knowledge in the subsidiary and the MNC network, knowledge sourced from 
network relations and knowledge sourced from local clusters.   We argue that these 
knowledge sources are managerial decision (control) variables.  Moreover, we argue 
that the success of developing knowledge from such sources is influenced by the 
degree of autonomy that is granted to the subsidiary, as well as the extent to which 
                                                 
2  Although an evolutionary conceptualization of the role of management in the differentiated MNC 
as one of “steered evolution” (cf. Lovas and Ghoshal 2000) may be the most appropriate one, 
because of the sheer complexity and partial unpredictability of the process. 
 3
  
interdependence with other MNC units is promoted.  Finally, we argue that the 
extent to which knowledge can be transferred within the MNC network reflects 
prior managerial choices with respect to the choice of source of knowledge and the 
way in which subsidiaries are organized. This is because the choice of knowledge 
sources and of MNC organization influences the characteristics of knowledge (e.g., 
tacit vs explicit).  
 In sum, our contribution in this paper are, on the overall level, to explicitly 
argue that the development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge can be 
influenced by MNC management through choices regarding organizational control, 
motivation and context. Indeed, we suggest that the choices regarding the 
development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge is really part of the same 
optimization problem; for example, to the extent that management chooses a specific 
way of sourcing knowledge, it also implicitly chooses the characteristics of the 
sourced knowledge and the ease with which it can be transferred inside the MNC.  
This is because knowledge from different knowledge sources have different 
characteristics and are thus transferred at different cost.  These arguments are, to our 
knowledge, novel to the literature. The empirical setting of this paper is the MNC, 
however, as seen from the perspective of the subsidiary. The hypotheses that we 
draw from the main argument are tested on the basis of a unique and very rich 
dataset on subsidiary knowledge development (including information on the 
organizational setting, sources of subsidiary knowledge and the extent of knowledge 
transfer to other MNC-units) that has been constructed in connection with a cross-
national project Centres of Excellence (Holm and Pedersen 2000a). The dataset 
covers more than 2.000 subsidiaries located in seven different European countries. 
II. Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
In this section, we develop the theoretical arguments that intra-MNC knowledge 
creation and transfer are influenced by managerial choices relating to 1) the sources 
of knowledge, 2) organizational instruments and 3) the mix of tacit and explicit 
components in the MNC knowledge structure.  These determinants are placed in the 
context of a view of the MNC as a knowledge structure. We begin by briefly 
explaining this conceptualization and then discuss the determinants seriatim. 
The MNC as a Knowledge Structure 
 Much of the recent MNC literature has stressed the role of MNCs as networks 
that facilitate MNC-wide learning processes (e.g., Hedlund 1986; Gupta and 
Govindarajan 1995). However, it is fair to say that this literature is not based on 
explicit theories of organizational knowledge.  Reference is sometimes made to 
organization-level “higher-order organizing principles” that exist for the purpose of 
easing organizational learning and “combinative capabilities” that create new 
applications of existing knowledge (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1993), however, these 
notions are seldom thoroughly explained.  For the purposes of this paper, we need 
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to take a slightly more detailed look at organizational knowledge. This will ease the 
understanding of processes of knowledge development and, in particular, 
knowledge transfer.  
 For the purpose of better understanding organizational knowledge, a pertinent 
contribution is Lyles and Schwenk (1992). They introduce the notion of an 
“organizational knowledge structure” to refer to shared beliefs at the organizational 
level about “… goals, cause-and-effect beliefs, and other cognitive elements.”  An 
attraction of their discussion is that they are quite explicit that inside firms, there 
exists a differentiation in the degree to which consensus exist with respect to these 
beliefs. Thus, in the firm’s “core” the degree of consensus is high, while in the 
“periphery” it is low. They further argue that the organizational knowledge 
structure is characterized by complexity which refers to “… the amount of 
information … within a knowledge structure” (p.163) and “… the degree to which 
cognitive units are interrelated” (p. 164), as well as by relatedness which refers to the 
degree of coupling (tight vs. loose) between elements in the core and periphery of 
knowledge structures. Though not developed for this purpose, an advantage of 
these distinctions is that they provide some content to attractive, but often not very 
specific notions of firms as repositories of knowledge, capabilities, competencies and 
the like.  
 Thus, inspired by Lyles and Schwenk (1992), we adopt a conceptualization of 
the MNC as a knowledge-based entity where the MNC knowledge stock is 
structured along a number of different dimensions. This conceptualization is entirely 
consistent with, but adds to, the basic perspective in recent work on the 
differentiated MNC, which we take to be that  subsidiaries control heterogeneous 
stocks of knowledge, and that the MNC may obtain competitive advantages from 
orchestrating knowledge flows between MNC units in such a way that knowledge is 
transferred to those MNC units where it will increase value-added.  Our 
conceptualization adds to this by more comprehensively identifying those 
dimensions according to which the MNC knowledge structure may be classified and 
by explaining how such an exercise leads directly into issues of transfer of 
knowledge. 
 To begin with, we argue that the distinction between core and peripheral 
knowledge and the dynamics between these make much sense in the context of 
MNCs.  Thus, as described by Lyles and Schwenk it is mainly in the periphery that 
new perspectives are developed.  The relatively recent discovery in the MNC-
literature of the role of subsidiaries as sources of new ideas, perspectives, etc. (e.g., 
Moore and Birkinshaw 1998; Holm and Pedersen 2000a) reflects a similar 
recognition that new sources of strength may arise outside the presumed core of the 
MNC. On the other hand, knowledge that is built in the context of the core is less 
costly to transfer to other parts of the MNC network than knowledge that arises in 
the periphery because it can rely on greater bandwidth communication channels 
(Heimann and Nickerson 2002).  Thus, there is a possible tradeoff between the 
novelty of ideas and the costs of communication. In turn, costs of communication are 
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positively influenced by the extent to which the knowledge structure is 
characterized by complexity (including the tacitness and the distance from the core).  
Finally, relations of complementarity (our counterpart to Lyles and Schwenk's 
"relatedness") characterize knowledge elements within the overall MNC knowledge 
structure.  By “complementarity” we refer to the extent to which combining different 
knowledge elements increases the potential gains to firms (Milgrom and Roberts 
1990; Buckley and Carter 1999).  
 These notions are descriptively richer with respect to characterizing the MNC 
knowledge structure than most other discussions.  Moreover, they are attractive, 
because they not only allows us to characterize an existing knowledge structure, but 
also opens the door to an understanding of knowledge development and transfer in 
the context of MNCs.  Thus, from this perspective, we may characterize the 
managerial decision problem with respect to management of MNC-wide knowledge 
as a matter of balancing expected benefits from transferring knowledge, as 
determined by complementarity, against the expected costs of this, where these costs 
are determined by complexity, tacitness, and the distance from the core.  We expand 
on this in the following, and then discuss how management may influence the costs 
and benefits of developing and transferring knowledge.  
Developing and Transferring Knowledge as Key Managerial Decision Problems 
 Although it is very often argued in the literature that the MNC owes its 
existence to its superior ability (relative to markets) to transfer knowledge and that 
this superior ability may at the same time be a source of competitive advantage 
(relative to purely domestic firms), it is also widely recognized that the resource 
costs of developing and transferring knowledge may often be substantial. With 
respect to the transfer of knowledge, Teece (1981) estimated that transfer costs for 
the intra-MNC technology transfer cases he examined ranged from 2, 24 percent to 
59 percent with a mean of 19,16 percent.  In the view of Kogut and Zander (1993: 
630) “… these costs are derived from the efforts to codify and teaching complex 
knowledge to recipient.”3 On the other hand, the benefits from transferring 
knowledge are often very substantial as suggested by Subramaniam and 
Venkatraman’s (2001) finding that transnational product development capability is 
highly dependent upon the transfer of knowledge in MNCs.  
 Given that both the costs and benefits of developing, transferring, codifying, 
teaching, etc. knowledge are so substantial, we submit that MNC management will 
not only build and transfer knowledge so that the benefits from these activities are 
balanced against their costs.  Management will also seek to control the determinants 
of these benefits and costs, aiming at increasing benefits while reducing costs. This 
                                                 
3 Similarly, Szulanski (1996) showed that his findings imply that the barriers to knowledge transfer 
were only to a very small extent motivational (at least in the sense of, for example, agency theory).  
Rather, the barriers to knowledge transfer had to do with causal ambiguity, the receiver’s 
absorptive capacity and the general atmosphere in the relation between sender and receiver. 
However, his findings did not relate to the context of cross-border knowledge transfer. 
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may be accomplished, among other things, through managerial choices relating to 
knowledge sources and organizational controls, motivation and context.  In terms of 
our earlier discussion of the MNC knowledge structure these managerial choices 
influence and are influenced by the complexity of the knowledge structure, the core-
periphery distinction, relations of complementarity between knowledge elements 
and the degree of tacitness of knowledge elements.  We assume that management 
will choose subsidiary knowledge sources and organizational mechanisms for 
transferring knowledge in such a way that the overall value of the MNC is 
maximized. However, in spite of their obvious empirical as well as theoretical 
importance, rather little is known about the determinants of intra-MNC knowledge 
flows4 in spite of some attention to knowledge characteristics (e.g., Hamel 1991; 
Kogut and Zander 1993; Simonin 1999), organizational controls, and motivational 
factors (Gupta and Govindarajan 1991, 1995).  The next sections consider the 
determinants of, first, knowledge sources of MNC subsidiaries and, second, 
organizational mechanisms in some detail and discuss their implications for the 
transfer of knowledge in MNCs.   
Sources, Characteristics and Transfer of Knowledge 
 As a general matter, impediments to knowledge transfer may be classified as 
either motivational or cognitive barriers  (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zander and 
Kogut 1995; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000).  In this section, we are primarily taken 
up with cognitive barriers to transfer, reserving motivational factors for later 
treatment.  Cognitive barriers to transfer are usually conceptualized in terms of such 
constructs as causal ambiguity, complexity, tacitness, absorptive capacity, and the 
like.  Although they make perfect theoretical sense, these variables may be hard to 
operationalize and measure.5  A more operational approach is to start directly from 
the sources of subsidiary knowledge and argue that these sources result in 
knowledge with different characteristics.  Given this, sources of knowledge may be 
treated as choice variables, so that under norms of managerial rationality, the MNC 
wide development and transfer of knowledge is optimized through the choice of 
knowledge sources (and organizational controls and motivation).   
 Although an internal element necessarily enters into the production of all 
subsidiary knowledge, it makes sense to distinguish between the following types of 
knowledge, derived from different knowledge sources:  
                                                 
4   Thus, Crossan and Inkpen (1994: 271) point out that “… while much of the MNC research has 
dealt with static theories of the firm and investigations of structural questions, very little research 
has delved into the process of knowledge transfer and the barriers to successful 
intraorganizational learning.” And as late as in 2000, Gupta and Govindarajan (2000: 474) 
observed that with some notable exceptions (e.g., Zander and Kogut 1995), “… very little 
systematic empirical investigation in the determinants of intra-MNC knowledge transfers has so 
far been attempted.”  See also Buckley and Carter (1999: 81) for similar observations.  
5   Although successful attempts do exist, for example,. Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Kogut and Zander 
1993; Simonin 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000. 
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1) Internal knowledge ⎯ that is, knowledge that is produced mainly through 
investing in the internal production of knowledge (e.g., much R&D).   
2) External knowledge ⎯ that is, knowledge that is to a large extent created on the 
basis of knowledge inputs from relations to external partners (customers, 
suppliers, etc.) or on the basis of knowledge inputs from a local cluster (e.g., a 
well educated work force, high quality research institutions, etc.).  
 The first category of knowledge is the kind of internal knowledge that has been 
highlighted in resource- and knowledge-based theories of the firm (Foss 1997).  In 
this literature, the focus has been on production and organization knowledge that is 
embodied in bundles of routines of a highly tacit and social nature. Teams of 
individuals operate it for some strategic purpose.  Because of its characteristics, such 
knowledge is strongly intertwined with the organization itself and is therefore hard 
(very costly) to trade in the market.  It may, however, be transferable at much lower 
cost inside the MNC network than across markets, particularly to the extent that 
internal knowledge is developed within the core of the MNC knowledge structure 
and is developed explicitly as a complement to other knowledge elements in the 
MNC network.  This leads us directly to the conventional argument for the existence 
of the MNC, which asserts that MNCs exist because of their comparative advantages 
(vis-a-vis markets) of transferring knowledge. Though arguably correct, that 
argument fails, however, to distinguish between the transfer of knowledge that 
differs in terms of sources.6  In contrast, we argue that the ease of transfer of 
knowledge is likely to be influenced by the sources of the knowledge. 
 Of course, no knowledge is entirely internally accumulated (Nohria and Eccles 
1992; Foss and Eriksen 1995; Kogut 2000); in fact, as we later elaborate, there may be 
significant relations of complementarity between internal and external knowledge 
sources.  Nevertheless, it makes conceptual and empirical sense to say that some 
knowledge is largely internally produced, while some other knowledge is strongly 
based on external knowledge inputs.  Conceptually, one may distinguish between 
two external sources of knowledge that may be available to subsidiary firms.  The 
first category may be called “network-based knowledge.” We here have in mind the 
gaining of knowledge from long-lasting interaction with specific external parties, 
notably customers or suppliers, and the use of that knowledge in the firm’s activities 
(Ford 1990).7 The second category may be called “cluster-based knowledge.” This 
kind of external knowledge is not to the same extent the result of long-lasting 
interaction with specific parties. Rather, it is based upon knowledge inputs from, for 
example, a well educated work force or local knowledge institutions, such as 
                                                 
6  Of course, the literature has introduced distinctions between, for example, R&D capabilities and 
marketing capabilities. However, this doesn’t go to the heart of the matter of the sources of 
knowledge. 
7  For example, Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) examine Toyota’s production network, and argue that 
Toyota’s ability to create, manage and take advantage of network-based knowledge flows is a 
strong explanation for the many productivity advantages enjoyed by Toyota (as well as its 
suppliers). 
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technical universities, etc. (Porter 1990; Porter and Sölvell 1999).   In this paper, we 
treat both categories as one, namely as “external knowledge.”  External knowledge 
constitutes the peripheral part of the MNC knowledge structure.  
 Our distinction between internal and external sources of knowledge in the 
subsidiary knowledge base is different from the conventional distinction between, 
for example, production, marketing or R&D knowledge; the latter types of 
knowledge may all in principle have both internal and external components, to 
varying degrees.  The advantage of our distinction is that it may be more plausibly 
discussed in terms of general characteristics of knowledge than the activity-based 
definitions of knowledge.  For example, it is hard to argue on apriori grounds that, 
for example, production knowledge is inherently more complex, ambiguous or tacit, 
and therefore harder to transfer, than marketing knowledge. In contrast, we consider 
it more justified to make this kind of arguments with respect to our distinction, 
although with considerable cautiousness.  
 Sidestepping motivational issues (which we deal with later), the success of 
knowledge transfer is primarily a matter of cognitive matters, such as the existence 
and richness of transmission channels (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Ghoshal, Korine 
and Szulanski 1994), the characteristics of the transferred knowledge in terms of 
such dimensions as tacitness, ambiguity, etc. (Zander and Kogut 1995; Szulanski 
1996), and the absorptive capacity of the target unit(s) (Gupta and Govindarajan 
2000).  We submit that these cognitive dimensions are systematically related to 
knowledge sources.  Specifically, internal knowledge is likely to be more easily 
transferable than external knowledge, fundamentally because it is more likely to lie 
in the core of the MNC knowledge structure and is more likely to be at least partly 
developed through interaction with other MNC units. Internally accumulated 
knowledge may be relatively easily transmitted through existing transmission 
channels, and although it may contain, for example, tacit elements, the absorptive 
capacity of target units is likely to be relatively high. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 1: Internal subsidiary knowledge will be positively correlated with knowledge 
transfer from subsidiaries to other MNC units.   
In contrast, external knowledge which tends to be of a more peripheral character in 
the MNC knowledge structure, is likely to be less easily transferable than internal 
knowledge.  This is because this type of knowledge is to a large extent derived from 
specific, perhaps very specific, problems and needs of the external parties with 
which the subsidiary interacts, and/or it consists of knowledge of local skill levels, 
tastes, regulatory authorities, etc., much of which may be hard to transfer or of no or 
little use for other MNC units.  External knowledge thus largely lies outside of the 
core of the MNC knowledge structure.  Therefore, it contains many elements that 
makes it hard to transfer to other MNC units.8  In fact, we argue that the more a 
                                                 
8  This is admittedly somewhat counter-intuitive, since it may be argued that some kinds of external 
knowledge may be less characterized by tacit elements than internal knowledge. For example, 
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subsidiary is prone to accumulate external knowledge, the less knowledge will it 
transfer to other MNC units. Given the above discussion, we can put forward the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: External subsidiary knowledge will be negatively correlated with intra-
MNC knowledge transfer, because external knowledge is not (or only weakly) 
complementary to knowledge in other MNC units.  
However, a key point of the literature on the differentiated MNC is that important 
knowledge may develop in what we call the periphery of the MNC knowledge 
structure - knowledge that when transferred and combined with complementary 
knowledge in other MNC units will yield a high value-added.   However, in order 
for such knowledge to be transferable and combinable with complementary 
knowledge in other MNC units, it has to be interpreted and formulated in such a 
way that it will be accessible to other units.  In terms of the distinction between 
external and internal knowledge, this may be accomplished by bringing external 
knowledge in more direct contact with internal knowledge.  Remember that we have 
defined internal knowledge to also include knowledge developed in the interaction 
between MNC units, that is, as also including the “codes” (Arrow 1974) through 
which communication may take place, and to include more core knowledge than 
peripheral knowledge.   Thus, we are not denying a key point of the literature on the 
differentiated MNC, but rather refining it.   Given this, we can put forward our third 
hypothesis: 
                                                                                                                                                       
knowledge inputs from local universities may have a high explicit knowledge content.  However, 
knowledge inputs from local universities may constitute a rather small part of cluster knowledge, 
given that the tendency in most MNCs is to source this kind of inputs in centrally placed R&D 
departments and not in local subsidiaries (Gassman and von Zedtwidtz 1999).  Moreover, the 
emphasis is not so much on tacit knowledge as a barrier of transfer as on whether the relevant 
knowledge lies within the core of the MNC knowledge structure.  Tacit knowledge may lie within 
this core. 
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Hypothesis 3: When brought in contact with internal knowledge, external knowledge 
is highly correlated with knowledge transfer from subsidiaries to other MNC units. 
In more formal terms, the interaction effect between internal and external 
knowledge is positively correlated with knowledge transfer from subsidiaries to 
other MNC units.  
Because internal and external knowledge are associated with different costs of 
transfer (different degrees of complexities and different tacit knowledge content) 
and with different complementarities, MNC management will influence the sources 
of knowledge that subsidiaries tap into in such a way that net benefits are 
maximized. However, influencing these sources through, for example, locational 
decisions, is not the only means of optimizing the accumulation and transfers of 
knowledge that is available to MNC management.  It can also make use of 
mechanisms of organizational control and motivation.  
 A basic organizational problem is to motivate the subsidiary to actually 
transfer knowledge that may be useful to other subsidiaries.  One problem concerns 
who should bear the resource costs of transferring knowledge and how the parties to 
the knowledge exchange are to be compensated. We shall abstract from this 
problem, and assume that the subsidiaries and the headquarters through structuring 
compensation in the right way can handle it.  A rather different motivational 
problem is that to the extent that a subsidiary possesses a knowledge monopoly it 
controls a lever of bargaining power in the MNC, since it controls a crucial 
complementary asset (Hart 1995).  Transferring knowledge is tantamount to giving 
up this power (Forsgren, Pedersen and Foss 1999; Holm and Pedersen 2000b).  
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) briefly point to such a problem. Foss and Pedersen 
(2001) argue that repeated know how exchange may act as a mechanism that keeps 
this bargaining problem at bay. In this paper, as in Foss and Pedersen (2001), we 
deal with subsidiaries that are involved in lengthy relations with headquarters and 
other subsidiaries and, hence, engage in repeated interaction with these. Thus, we 
believe it is justified to assume that in fact subsidiaries will be motivated to transfer 
knowledge.  However, one point that has not been dealt with concerns the 
organizational mechanisms of control and motivation that may be applied, not just 
to the transfer of knowledge, but also to the development of knowledge. 
Organizational Control and Motivation and Developing Knowledge  
  Many contributions to the MNC literature recognize that the process of 
knowledge transfer is likely to be supported by different organizational means of 
control and motivation (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan 
1991, 1995; Buckley and Carter 1999). Indeed, a key theme in many recent 
contributions is that interdependencies (complementarities) between knowledge 
flows strongly condition the choice of types of management systems and processes 
for managing subsidiary relations (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan 1995).  
 We agree with the basic thrust of this literature.  However, we add two points.  
First, the choice of organizational mechanisms of control and motivation also 
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influence the accumulation of knowledge in the sense that the application of 
different mechanisms lead to different kinds of knowledge being accumulated.  
Second, causality may go in the reverse direction in the sense that the choice of 
organizational mechanisms of control and motivation also influence the 
transferability of knowledge.  Consider these points in turn.   
 The knowledge structure of the MNC contains shared elements as well as local 
elements (in the sense of Hayek 1945), for example, knowledge about local tastes, 
technologies, regulators, suppliers, etc. In order to efficiently utilize the local 
elements of the knowledge, it will often be necessary to delegate rights to make 
decisions that involve such local knowledge to those decision-makers that best know 
how to turn the relevant knowledge to productive uses.   Along such lines, it may be 
argued that granting more decision rights to a MNC subsidiary ⎯ giving it more 
autonomy ⎯ improves the incentives of the subsidiary to engage in the 
accumulation of local knowledge (cf. Aghion and Tirole 1997).  Local knowledge is 
more likely to be of the external kind than of the internal. If subsidiary knowledge is 
mainly based on external knowledge, it is hard for MNC headquarters and top-
management to direct the subsidiary’s acquisition of such knowledge because of the 
knowledge asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling 1992) and because the subsidiary is 
distant from the core in the knowledge structure.  Thus, stimulating the 
development of external knowledge in a subsidiary ⎯ for example, in the hope of 
increasing local marketing and product development ⎯ may involve granting a high 
degree of autonomy to the subsidiary.  This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4:  The development of external knowledge in MNC subsidiaries is 
positively influenced by the degree of autonomy granted to the subsidiary. 
 In contrast to external knowledge, internal knowledge is produced mainly 
through investing in the internal production of knowledge (e.g., much R&D) or from 
learning by doing, using, etc. in the subsidiary itself, or developed through 
interaction with other units in the MNC network.  The emphasis is on developing 
knowledge that is at least potentially transferable.  Such knowledge will typically lie 
within the core of the MNC knowledge structure.  Also, the accumulation of internal 
knowledge in a subsidiary will strongly reflect perceived complementarities with 
knowledge elements in other parts of the MNC; more precisely, developing such 
knowledge takes place with an eye to these potential benefits.  Thus, we put forward 
the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: Developing internal knowledge in MNC subsidiaries are 
positively influenced by the perceived interdependencies (complementarities) 
between the focal subsidiary and other MNC units. 
Further, the development of internal knowledge is likely to be stimulated by the 
transfer of goods and/or services between MNC units.  This is because the transfer 
of goods and/or services, that is, intra-MNC trade, is in itself a force pulling in the 
direction of a widening of the bandwidth of communication channels. This prompts 
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the discovery of new opportunities for realizing complementarities between 
knowledge components (Kirzner 1973). Thus: 
Hypothesis 6: Developing internal knowledge in MNC subsidiaries is positively 
influenced by the amount of trade between the focal subsidiary and other MNC units. 
The hypotheses are summarized in the following model. 
 
XXXXXX INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE XXXXXX 
 
 
III. Data and Method 
Data Collection 
 The data has been collected as part of the Centres of Excellence-project that 
engaged researchers in the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Portugal and Canada. The CoE-project was launched in May 1996 
with the purpose of investigating headquarter-subsidiary relationships and the 
internal flow of knowledge in MNCs. A leading priority was to get proper data for 
the project, and in order to collect quantitative data on acquisition of subsidiary 
knowledge it was decided to construct a questionnaire that could be applied in all 
the involved countries. After several project meetings and extensive reliability tests 
of the questionnaire on both academics and business managers, this was 
accomplished.9
 For practical reasons, it was decided that each project member should be 
responsible for gathering data on foreign-owned subsidiaries within their own 
country. Thus, all subsidiaries in the database belong to MNCs. In the data 
gathering, subsidiary managers, rather than headquarters, have been respondents. 
One advantage of choosing subsidiary respondents is that they are directly engaged 
in the market and therefore are more acquainted with its characteristics. Although 
we can expect that the subsidiary have a reliable awareness of its own competencies, 
it would be an advantage to gather information on intra-MNC knowledge flows 
from other corporate units as well. However, it would be an unmanageable task first 
to identify the subsidiaries in each country and then to identify the relevant 
management units in the foreign MNCs.   
 The paper is based on empirical data from seven countries: Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK. All countries are located in the 
northern part of Europe, and the four Nordic countries are considered to be 
relatively small, while Germany and the UK are among the largest in Europe. 
Approximately 80 per cent of the questionnaires were answered by subsidiary 
executive officers, while financial managers, marketing managers or controllers in 
                                                 
9 For more information on the CoE-project, see Holm and Pedersen (2000a). 
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the subsidiary answered the remaining 20 per cent. The response rate varies between 
20 (UK) and 55 per cent (Sweden), depending on the country of investigation. The 
quality of the data is quite high with a general level of missing values of not more 
than 5 per cent.  
 XXXXXXXX INSERT TABLE 1 HERE XXXXXXXX 
 As shown in table 2, the total sample covers information on 2.107 subsidiaries. 
It comprises all kinds of subsidiaries in all fields of business. Between countries, the 
sample ranges from 202 (UK) to 530 (Sweden). With the exception of Sweden, the 
size of the sample is rather similar in the other six countries. The average number of 
employees in the subsidiaries is 742 and the median is 102. Within the five smaller 
countries, the average size of the subsidiaries are very similar, while Germany and 
UK ⎯ due to their larger market sizes ⎯ comprise substantially larger subsidiaries. 
As we expect larger subsidiaries to comprise more knowledge and therefore more 
potential for knowledge transfer we need to control for this bias in the data material 
when conducting our tests of the hypotheses.  
 For all these subsidiaries are covered information on the level of subsidiary 
competencies, the sources of this competence, organizational context variables, and 
to what extent the knowledge has been transferred to other MNC-units. The 
subsidiaries were asked to indicate the level of competence for six different activities 
performed by the subsidiary on a seven-point Likert scale, from 1=very weak 
competence to 7=very strong competence. The six activities are research (basic and 
applied), development (of products and processes), production (of goods and 
services), marketing and sales, logistics and distribution and purchasing. The 
average score on the seven-point scale of the level of competence is shown in table 3.  
 XXXXXXXX INSERT TABLE 2 HERE XXXXXXXX 
In general, the subsidiaries are indicating that they comprises a relatively high level 
of competence for all activities with average values ranging from 4 to 6 in the upper 
level of the seven-point scale. The pattern is very similar for all the six countries with 
the highest competence levels for production and marketing/sales and somewhat 
lower levels for the four other activities. As expected, the larger German and UK 
subsidiaries have higher competence levels than the other subsidiaries in the sample. 
They have slightly higher values than the total sample for all six activities.  
Measures 
 All data were collected through the questionnaire and most variables are multi-
item measures that  were measured using seven-point Likert scales. However, items 
such as the number of employees were measured using actual values. The following 
sections provide the exact wording used for questionnaire items. 
 Knowledge transfer. Following, Foss and Pedersen (2001) our definition of 
knowledge transfer is capturing the application rather than the physical transfer of 
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the subsidiary knowledge in other MNC units. Accordingly, in the questionnaire the 
subsidiaries have been asked to what extent the subsidiary knowledge has been of 
use to other MNC units. Respondents have indicated this on a seven-point Likert 
scale, where 1 was defined as “to no use at all for other units” and 7 was defined as 
“very useful for other units” for all the six above-mentioned activities. Knowledge 
transfer is a multi-item construct calculated as the average score reported by 
respondents across these six items (Alpha=0.74). 
 Internal knowledge. The construct of internal knowledge is capturing both the 
subsidiaries own effort of knowledge production and the knowledge developed 
through interaction with other MNC units. The subsidiaries own knowledge 
production was measured by asking respondents to assess the level of investments 
in the subsidiary in the past three years, where 1=very limited, 7=substantial. The 
level of investments was assessed for all the six above-mentioned activities. In order 
to measure the knowledge developed through interaction with other MNC units the 
respondents was asked to assess the impact of various internal organizations on the 
development of the subsidiary's competencies, where 1=no impact at all, 7=very 
decisive impact. Three organizations were identified: internal MNC customers, 
internal MNC suppliers, and internal MNC R&D units. In the models used to test 
our hypotheses we use a composite measure, Internal knowledge, based on the 
average across all nine items (Alpha=0.73). 
 External knowledge. The variable of external knowledge is capturing both the 
importance of external counterparts (like customers and suppliers) and the local 
cluster as sources of knowledge development in the subsidiary. The inputs from 
external partners was measured by asking respondents to assess the impact of 
various external organizations on the development of the subsidiary's competencies, 
where 1=no impact at all, 7=very decisive impact. Four organizations were 
identified: external market customers, external market suppliers, specific distributor 
and specific external R&D unit. Building on the elements of Porter's (1990) diamond 
model, respondents were asked to assess the business environment in which they 
compete along the following dimensions: Availability of business professionals; 
availability of supply material; quality of suppliers; level of competition; 
government support; favorable legal environment; and existence of research 
institutions (1=very low, 7=very high). In the diamond model, the items are 
presented as different dimensions, however, Porter's (1990) own emphasis on the 
holistic nature of the model and the high inter-correlation between many of the 
items motivated us to construct a composite index. External knowledge is calculated as 
the average score reported by respondents across these eleven items (Alpha=0.68).   
 Interdependence (Complementarity). This variable measures the extent to 
which the MNC units are dependent on the subsidiaries and vice versa. The MNC 
dependence on the subsidiary knowledge were assessed by asking the respondents 
the following question: “What would be the consequences for other units in the 
Foreign Company if they no longer had access to the competencies of the 
subsidiary?”  (1=no consequences, 7=very significant consequences). In a similar 
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vein, the subsidiary dependence on knowledge from other MNC units was captured 
by the following question: “What would be the consequences for the subsidiary if it 
no longer had access to the competencies of other MNC units?”  (1=no 
consequences, 7=very significant consequences). Taken together these two items 
reflects the interdependence between the focal subsidiary and other MNC units.  
 Intra-MNC trade. The level of intra-MNC trade is an indicator of the breadth of 
the internal trade links. It is measured as a single item, as the share of subsidiary sale 
going to other MNC units in 1996. The subsidiary sale to other MNC units includes 
both semi-products and final goods and services. 
 Autonomy. Based on the scale developed by Roth and Morrison (1992), 
respondents were asked to identify the level at which certain decisions were made, 
where 1=foreign corporate (HQ), 2=sub-corporate (e.g. division), 3=subsidiary level. 
Decisions were as follows: Hiring top subsidiary management; entering new 
markets within the country; entering foreign markets; changes to subsidiary 
organization; introduction of new products/services; approval of quarterly 
plan/schedules. Our measure, Autonomy, is based on the average of these six items 
(Alpha=0.61). 
 Controls. To control for structural characteristics of the subsidiary that might 
also influence the extent of knowledge transfer, we controlled for the following 
factors: Number of subsidiary employees in 1996 (a proxy for size), its mode of 
formation (a dummy: greenfield or acquisition), and the host country of the 
subsidiary (six dummies: using UK as a base case). We expect that larger 
subsidiaries will be more likely to transfer knowledge to other MNC units, 
consistent with our theoretical arguments of a cumulative process of knowledge 
development in foreign subsidiaries. We have no predictions on the role of entry 
mode and the country dummies for the extent of knowledge transfer. 
  
IV. Results 
Tests of Hypotheses  
 The six hypotheses may be summarized in three basic models as follows.
  
1) Internal knowledge =  Interdependencies + Intra-MNC trade + Error 
2) External knowledge  =  Autonomy + Error 
 
3) Transfer of knowledge =  Internal knowledge + External knowledge  + Internal 
knowledge*External knowledge + Controls + Error 
 
Hypotheses 1-3 are reflected in model 3, while hypothesis 4 is expressed in model 2, 
and, finally, hypotheses 5-6 are expressed in model 1. However, since the above 
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models represent decisions that are interdependent (they have to be considered 
jointly), the use of single equation models may yield biased results and obscure 
interesting theoretical possibilities. Since the above models are interdependent, then 
it is possible that the joint optimization of all involved decisions may lead to 
suboptimization of one or more individual decisions. Statistically the 
interdependence might be reflected in that error terms of the three models are 
somehow correlated. Hence the correct model to estimate these decisions is a 
simultaneous equation model as three-stage least square, that circumvent the 
problem of interdependence by using instrument variables (often the exogenous 
variables) to obtain predicted values of the endogenous variables (in our case: 
knowledge transfer, internal knowledge, and external knowledge).  
 We have applied the three-stage least square regression techniques (3SLS) with 
instrument variables to test all six hypotheses simultaneously. All the exogenous 
variables (interdependencies, intra-MNC trade, autonomy, subsidiary employees, 
mode of formation, and country dummies) are used as instrument variables in the 
estimation of the model. The result of the total model is reported in Table 4. 
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. 
 
XXXXXXXX  INSERT TABLE 3 HERE XXXXXXXX 
 Overall, the system of the three equations (models) works well with a system 
weighted R-square of 0.44. This indicates that almost half of the observed variation 
in the extent of knowledge transfer is explained by the variables in the model.  We 
turn now to the tests of our explanatory hypotheses. 
 Starting backwards with hypotheses 5 and 6, recall that they posited a 
relationship between the interdependence and intra-MNC trade and internal 
knowledge development. These hypotheses are tested in the first equation and they 
are strongly supported.  Both organizational decision variables have a significantly 
positive relationship with the development of internal knowledge (both at 1 per cent 
level). Hypothesis 4, on autonomy determining the development of external 
knowledge is also supported with a significant positive relationship, although only 
at 5 per cent level. 
 Hypotheses 1-3 proposing that the development of internal and external 
subsidiary knowledge is facilitating the level of knowledge transfer are tested in the 
third equation. All three hypotheses are supported, indicating that development of 
internal knowledge has a positive effect (at the 1 per cent level), while the 
development of external knowledge has a direct negative impact (5 per cent level) on 
the transfer of knowledge to other MNC units. However, the interaction effect of 
internal knowledge and external knowledge has a strong positive (1 per cent level) 
relationship with the level of knowledge transfer. These results point to the 
conclusion that while internal knowledge have a direct and positive effect on 
knowledge transfer, the effect external knowledge is more indirect going through 
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the interaction with internal knowledge, which might prove that external knowledge 
must be transformed from periphery to core knowledge before the knowledge 
transfer takes place. 
 The number of subsidiary employees turn out to be insignificant, while 
acquisitions do transfer more knowledge than green-fields to other MNC units 
(formation is significant). Recall that UK was used as a base case for the six country 
dummies, therefore the country dummies shows that subsidiaries from Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden are transferring significantly less knowledge to other MNC 
units than do the foreign owned subsidiaries hosted in UK (and Finland, Germany, 
and Austria). This might be explained by the small size of the Scandinavian markets 
and the location in the periphery of Europe.   
    
V. Concluding Comments 
In this paper, we have addressed the issue of knowledge transfer between MNC 
units in a novel way. Whereas most of the literature have paid rather little attention 
to the organizational aspects of development and transfer of knowledge. The 
development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge are seldom consistently 
taken to be endogenous to organizational processes and arrangements. In the 
literature, it is rather the other way around. Organizational arrangements are seen as 
rational responses to the requirements implied by different characteristics of 
knowledge. Most fundamentally, there is no coherent view of what it means to say 
that the MNC is a knowledge-based entity.  
 In this paper we have argued that adopting Lyles and Schwenk's  (1992) notion 
of an organizational knowledge structure might be a good way to conceptualize the 
MNC as a knowledge-based entity. This notion allows us an understanding of the 
processes of knowledge development and knowledge transfer in MNCs, and the 
organizational mechanism that influence these processes. 
 We largely found support for the main argument of the paper that MNC 
management through choices regarding organizational control, motivation and 
context can influence the development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge. It 
was shown that organizational choice variables as the level of subsidiary autonomy 
(own decision-making), level of intra-MNC-trade, and interdependence among the 
subsidiary and other MNC units all have a bearing on the development of different 
sources of subsidiary knowledge. 
 Furthermore, internally sourced knowledge has a direct positive effect, while 
externally sourced knowledge has a direct negative effect on subsidiary knowledge 
transfer. However, the indirect effect of externally sourced knowledge going 
through the interaction (and transformation) with internally sourced knowledge also 
has a positive effect on subsidiary knowledge transfer. This indicate that the extent 
that management chooses a specific way of sourcing knowledge, it also implicitly 
chooses the characteristics of the sourced knowledge and the ease with which it can 
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be transferred inside the MNC. This is because knowledge from different knowledge 
sources has different characteristics and is thus transferred at different cost.  
 However, there are various problems with our approach that need to be briefly 
commented upon. First of all, the measures that proxy organizational means and 
context (Interdependence, Intra-MNC Trade, Autonomy) admittedly do so only 
rather imperfectly, and we would have preferred to have much more direct 
measures.   For example, it is somewhat unclear what kind of organizational means 
or context the measure, Intra-MNC Trade exactly represents.  However, these are 
unavoidable limitations of the dataset.   
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Table 1 Sample size and subsidiary employees in the different countries 
 
COUNTRY SAMPLE SIZE SUBSIDIARY EMPLOYEES (mean) 
Austria 313 318 
Denmark 308 284 
Finland 238 200 
Germany 254 1.574 
Norway 262 130 
Sweden 530 244 
UK 202 3.787 
Total 2.107 742 
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Table 2 The average score on a seven-point scale of the level of competence. 
 
COUNTRY Research Development Production Marketing
/sales 
Logistics/ 
distribution 
Purchasing 
Austria 3.1 4.4 5.8 6.1 5.7 5.2 
Denmark 4.8 5.2 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.3 
Finland 4.3 4.9 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.3 
Germany 4.6 5.3 6.3 6.2 5.9 5.7 
Norway 4.2 4.9 5.6 5.7 5.3 5.2 
Sweden 4.7 5.3 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.2 
UK 4.9 5.3 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.5 
Total 4.4 5.1 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.3 
 
 25
  
Table 3: The three-stage least squares estimation 
of a simultaneous equation model. 
 
 Equations 
 INTERNAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
EXTERNAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
TRANSFER OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
Intercept      2.38 
    (0.06)*** 
         3.71 
        (0.08)*** 
         1.29 
        (1.43) 
Interdependence      0.10 
    (0.02)*** 
  
Intra-MNC trade      0.08 
    (0.01)*** 
  
Autonomy       
     
         0.09 
        (0.04)** 
 
Internal knowledge           
         
         0.99 
        (0.24)*** 
External knowledge           -1.33 
        (0.56)** 
Internal knowledge* 
External knowledge 
           0.28 
        (0.01)*** 
Employees         0.00002 
     (0.00002) 
Formation           0.26 
       (0.06)*** 
Country dummies: 
- Austria 
- Denmark 
- Finland 
- Germany 
- Norway 
- Sweden 
   
   0.32  (0.24)  
  -0.39  (0.13)*** 
0.10 (0.18) 
0.20 (0.26) 
  -0.50  (0.11)*** 
  -0.49  (0.11)*** 
      F-value 
      R-square 
      N 
      90.61*** 
       
      2056 
        2.30** 
         
        2056 
       73.40*** 
        0.44 
        2056 
 
***, ** and * = significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
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Figure 1: The hypothesized model 
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